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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates one of the main sources of financial markets’ public information: financial 
analysts’ reports. We analyze reports on S&P 500 index through a multidisciplinary approach 
integrating behavioral finance with linguistic analysis to understand how financial phenomena reflect 
in or are deviated by language, i.e. whether financial and linguistic trends follow the same patterns, 
boosting each other, or diverge. In the latter, language could conceal financial events, mitigating 
analysts’ feelings and misleading investors. Therefore, we attempt to identify behavioral biases (mainly 
represented by cognitive dissonances) present in analysts’ reports. In doing so, we try to understand 
whether analysts try to hide perception of negative price-sensitive events or not, eventually 
anticipating and controlling the market “mood”. The study focuses on how analysts use linguistic 
strategies in order to minimize their risk of issuing wrong advice. Our preliminary results show 
reluctance to incorporate negative information in the reports. A slight asymmetry between the use of 
positive/negative keywords taken into account and the negative/positive trends of the index seems to 
emerge. In those weeks characterized by the index poor performances, the frequency of keywords with 
a negative meaning is lower. On the contrary, in the recovering weeks a higher use of keywords with a 
positive meaning does not clearly appear. A thorough investigation on the market moods, and the 
analysis of the text of the reports enable us to assess if and to what extent analysts have been willing to 
mitigate pessimism or emphasize confidence. Furthermore, we contribute to the existing literature 
also proposing a possible analysts’ value function based on the Prospect Theory [Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979] where analysts try to maximize the value deriving from enhancing their reputation, 
taking into account the risks that may cause a reputational loss. This theoretical framework supports 
our preliminary findings and supports the idea that analysts are risk-averse when facing reputational 
gains and risk-seeking in case of potential reputational losses.**** 
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Introduction 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) suggests 
that market prices should incorporate all the available 
information about securities’ cash flows prospects. 
This idea has represented an accepted cornerstone for 
most established asset allocation models in the past 
forty years. Such models also involve the assumption 
that individuals in the market act rationally. 
As a consequence, the market should not react 
anomalously, if at all, to stale information, nor should 
well-known events be the origin of a generalized 
sudden crisis.  
Recent events in the market have though 
demonstrated the frequent fallacy of such models. 
Particularly, they have failed in predicting single 
institution defaults as well as systematic turmoil, 
default contagions and global crises until too late to 
react. 
Canvassing recent history, in the past twelve 
years we assisted two global financial crises, in which 
market actors systematically failed in correctly 
considering fundamental values and in properly 
diversifying their portfolios, due to risk 
underestimation and prediction capability 
overestimation. These events led researchers and 
practitioners to develop highly sophisticate 
quantitative models to evaluate and predict security 
prices and market paths. Many researchers and 
practitioners claim that quantitative models, though 
very sophisticated, often suffer severe limits in 
dealing with irrational human behavior. In particular, 
forecast models suffer similar limits in dealing with 
global political and economic instability. 
This paper investigates one of the main sources 
of financial markets’ public information: financial 
analysts’ reports. In particular, we analyze reports on 
S&P 500 index through a multidisciplinary approach 
integrating behavioral finance [Shefrin, 2002, 2006] 
with linguistic analysis. We analyze how financial 
phenomena reflect in or are deviated by language, i.e. 
whether financial and linguistic trends follow the 
same patterns, boosting each other, or diverge. In the 
latter, language could conceal financial events, 
mitigating analysts feelings and misleading investors. 
Therefore, we attempt to identify behavioral biases 
(mainly represented by cognitive dissonances) 
present in the reports. 
In analyzing reports, we try to understand 
whether analysts have an early perception of the 
incumbent relevant events or not, i.e., if they have a 
better understanding of the market “mood”. 
Subsequently, we compare the content and structure 
of the reports to the S&P 500 performance in 
different periods. 
The study focuses on the presence of 
contradictions between the actual fluctuation of the 
index returns, on the one hand, and the evaluation of 
such trends by analysts and their possible message, 
on the other. 
Our preliminary results show reluctance to 
incorporate negative information in the reports. A 
visible asymmetry between the use of 
positive/negative keywords taken into account and 
the negative/positive trends of the index emerges. In 
those weeks characterized by the index poor 
performances, the frequency of keywords with a 
negative meaning is lower. On the contrary, in the 
recovering weeks a higher use of keywords with a 
positive meaning does not clearly appear. A thorough 
investigation on the market moods, and the analysis 
of the text of the reports enable us to assess if and to 
what extent analysts have been willing to mitigate 
pessimism or emphasize confidence. 
We assume that analysts develop doubts and 
concerns earlier than investors, who instead need 
longer time to incorporate them in security prices and 
express them in their reports. This is due to several 
reasons linked to the role analysts play in the 
financial market, to their bonds with institutions and 
to the effect of their reports on the dynamics 
developing in the market itself (i.e. information 
efficiency). Other reasons are more directly 
connected to individuals’ cognitive distortions 
studied by behavioral finance, which not even 
established professionals are able to avoid. 
 
1.  Literature Review 
 
The EMH [Fama, 1970] is based on the idea that 
prices in the market tend to incorporate all the 
available information about securities’ cash flows 
prospects. This idea has represented an accepted 
cornerstone for most established asset allocation 
models in the past forty years, involving that 
individuals in the market act rationally Markowitz 
[1952, 1959].  
Fama proposed three types of efficiency: (i) the 
strong form; (ii) the semi-strong form; and (iii) the 
weak form. In the weak form, prices can be predicted 
from a historical price trend thus profiting from it is 
impossible. The semi-strong form tests whether all 
public information, such as companies' 
announcements or annual earnings figures, is 
reflected in prices. Finally, the strong form concerns 
all information, including private information, and 
implies that no monopolistic information can entail 
profits. In other words, insider trading cannot earn a 
profit in the strong-form market efficiency world. 
Thus, efficiency posits that the capital market is 
efficient when security prices fully reflect all known 
information and none of the investors can have 
monopoly control of it. In this sense, agreeing on a 
clear meaning of the expression “fully reflect”, which 
is rather helpful in setting empirical tests on any 
efficient market proposition, becomes essential. 
As Fama claims, on the basis of his own 
empirical tests, full market efficiency (i.e. the strong 
form) is not clearly and easily met [Ball and Brown, 
1968; Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 1969; 
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Iederhoffer and Osborne, 1966; Scholes, 1969]. 
Nevertheless, the effect of information on price 
dynamics is an accepted point, at least in the semi-
strong form. At the same time, rejecting the EMH 
implies the rejection of the market equilibrium model 
(e.g. the price setting mechanism). 
Market efficiency denotes how information is 
factored in prices. The hypothesis of market 
efficiency must be tested in the context of expected 
returns: when a model yields a return which 
significantly differ from the actual return, one can 
never be certain as whether this is due to an 
imperfection in the model or to the market 
inefficiency. This concept, known as the “joint 
hypothesis problem” [Fama, 1970], has ever since 
vexed researchers. Thus, market efficiency per se is 
not testable but has to be tested jointly with an 
equilibrium asset-pricing model [Fama, 1991]. 
The only possibility left is then to modify the 
model by adding different factors in order to mitigate 
anomalies and to fully explain the return exploited by 
the model itself [Fama, 1992]. Therefore, the same 
anomalies work as signals. However, as long as they 
exist, neither the conclusion of a flaw model nor of 
market inefficiency can be drawn according to the 
joint hypothesis. 
The EMH is widely recognized as an elegant 
theory that has held great attention among scholars 
and practitioners, leading to the idea that free markets 
are the most efficient means of allocating economic 
resources. If investors rapidly and rationally 
incorporate all available information into stock 
prices, then stock selection is a quite futile activity: 
no risk-adjusted returns exceeding the market ones 
can be earned from stock selection. Given this idea, 
several questions could arise on why institutions and 
investors put consistent amounts of money in market 
analyses and market information production. 
If an active portfolio management strategy based 
on identifying “undervalued” stocks is basically 
unworthy, and if outperformance relative to a valid 
benchmark is a random outcome rather than the result 
of insightful investment decision making, then the 
distinction between luck and skill appears extremely 
vague and undetermined.  
Still, financial information and available trading 
strategies cannot avoid biases and irrational behaviors 
among investors, as evidenced by the increase in the 
frequency and severity of bubbles and crashes in the 
markets. Irrational behaviors by individual and 
institutional investors drove researchers to develop 
new theories on how people act in the market: an 
example is behavioral finance, which is often and 
wrongly seen as an anti-EMH theory. Human beings 
are definitely subject to errors and biases in their 
decision making. Moreover, the ability of more 
sophisticated, though not always more rational 
investors, to correct mispricing shows to be quite 
limited [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997].  
At the same time, several researchers all over 
the world insist on declaring their loyalty to the 
EMH, considering the fact that behavioral finance has 
not yet proposed any market model likely to have the 
same elegance, strong theoretical framework and 
general applicability as the traditional ones. The 
bottom line seems to be represented by the fact that 
the evidence against market efficiency from the long-
term return studies appears significantly fragile and 
anomalies become methodological illusions [Fama, 
1998].1 Thus, the debate on the theory of behavioral 
finance turns too often into a debate on Efficient 
Market vs. Inefficient Market Hypotheses. Such a 
debate, although very useful to help improve the 
theoretical understanding of market behavior, does 
not necessarily involve behavioral finance and 
sometimes leads to extreme positions and 
assumptions, which seem very much arguable on both 
sides. Market inefficiency are also considered by the 
EMH, although traditional models do not help much 
to predict the moment in which biases will appear, 
their intensity, or how long their effects on prices will 
last. This way, behavioral finance would appear as a 
simple observation of common and systematic errors, 
still remaining embedded in the traditional theory 
framework while, more rigorously, it should not. 
Much more appealing seems to be an image reported 
by Vernon Smith in his 2002 Nobel Prize Lecture, in 
which he does not oppose rationality to irrationality 
but, instead, uses constructivist and ecological 
rationality. That is to say that often, and virtually in 
every aspect of their lives, individuals must make 
decisions under uncertainty constraints, basically 
originated by the lack of time, by incomplete 
information and, of course, by the lack of skills. 
Such decisions originate “fast and frugal 
decision making.” They are “ecologically rational to 
the degree that they are adapted to the structure of an 
environment.” [Smith, 2002, p. 502]. 
Moreover, even in the past, economists argued 
that the values to which people respond are not 
necessarily confined to those one would expect, based 
on the narrowly defined canons of rationality. 
Individuals define and pursue their own interest in 
their own way, which is, an “ecological expected 
utility”, to use Vernon Smith figures, that leads to a 
new, smoother concept of “economic man”. [Smith, 
2002, p. 502]. 
Instead, traditional theory is meant to be:  
the theory of rational behavior […] a study of 
the principles upon which a rational man would act. 
This rational man is unlike you and me in that he 
makes no errors in arithmetic or logic in attempting to 
achieve his clearly defined objectives. He is like you 
and me, on the other hand, in that he is neither 
                                                          
1 “ ... an efficient market generates categories of events that 
individually suggest that prices over-react to information. But 
in an efficient market, apparent underreaction will be about 
as frequent as overreaction. If anomalies split randomly 
between underreaction and overreaction, they are consistent 
with market efficiency” [Fama, 1998, p. 284]. 
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omnipotent nor omniscient. He must make decisions, 
such as the selection of a portfolio, in the face of 
uncertainty. Since his information is limited, he may 
take less than perfect actions. Since his power are 
limited, his achievement may fall short of the best 
conceivable. Every action however, is perfectly 
thought out; every risk is perfectly calculated. 
[Markowitz, 1959, p. 206]. 
However, field observation, as well as 
everyone’s experience, shows a different picture. No 
one can consistently apply rational logical principles 
to everything he or she does. Cognitive effort costs 
often exceed benefits. Theorems rarely contain such 
errors. Nevertheless, bounded rationality imposes 
severe limitations on our capacity to develop 
economic theories much earlier than it does on our 
economic behavior. 
Markets, as social institutions, are the result of 
conscious deductive processes of human reason. As 
such, they are intended to emerge from a deliberate 
creation of consciousness. This idea implies 
rationality as a basic tool of consciousness and 
correct information as a basic ingredient. Therefore, 
economic behavior is definitely a social behavior. 
Neuroscience defines social behavioral output as a 
function of online processing of social stimuli [Crick 
and Dodge, 1994]. This leads to the consequence that 
a social behavior like investing in the capital market 
requires people to direct their attention to precise 
stimuli (information on investment fundamentals) 
coming from the specific environment considered 
(the capital market and analyst reports) and gives 
meaning to them. Only after mentally ordering those 
stimuli, investors can consider their personal utility 
function in terms of goals and expected returns. After 
calculating the outcomes associated with possible 
behavioral responses (coherent with the social 
environment), individuals decide on their personal 
response [Beer, 2007]. 
This is why emotions have very strong and 
predictable effects on cognition and decision 
processes. Emotional experiences engage sensible 
cognitive strategies that influence response selection 
[Levenson, 1999]. People with a positive sentiment 
are more likely to engage in automatic cognitive 
processes, react quickly, underestimate risk and focus 
on positive explanations when making decisions or 
judgments. On the other hand, when people are 
negatively biased, they are more likely to engage in 
effortful cognitive processes, react more slowly, 
overestimate risk, and focus on negative explanations 
when making decisions or judgments. 
Interpreting the above statement in terms of the 
EMH requires agents to have proper information and 
the capacity to use it in the best way. Also, because of 
our brain physiology, such a talented mind would be 
totally incapable to stop the number of iterations 
needed to make a proper decision at an appropriate 
level [Damasio, 2005]. This may cause the temptation 
in scholars to ignore this reality because poorly 
understood, and because it does not yield to our 
familiar although inadequate modeling tools, and to 
proceed in the implicit belief that functions and 
curves capture the most essential elements of what we 
observe. 
Deliberately creating action rules and being 
conscious of their effectiveness require to remain 
sensitive to the fact that most human decision making 
is not primarily guided, if at all, by conscious 
rationality. Our brain has developed over the past 
millennia arrangement capacities and survival 
properties that take into account opportunity costs 
and environmental challenges which are invisible – 
so far - to any possible modeling effort. In this 
respect, the most revealing example is the role played 
by trust in social behavior everywhere in the world, at 
different times and among all species socially 
organized. Trusting someone implies the existence of 
an interpersonal link aimed at achieving an improved 
state compared to the status quo. The possible 
outcomes of a choice strongly depend on the 
combined effects of other people’s choices and 
behavior. Being impossible to adequately calculate all 
implications for each external stimulus, trust operates 
as a consistent simplifying factor [Arrow, 1974]. 
Following Vernon Smith, “We have become 
accustomed to the idea that a natural system like the 
human body or an ecosystem regulates itself. To 
explain the regulation, we look for feedback loops 
rather than a central planning and directing body. But 
somehow our intuitions about self-regulation do not 
carry over to the artificial systems of human society. 
The actual shape we observe is the consequence of 
myriads of individual decisions” [Smith, 2002, p. 
502, here referring to Herbert Simon]. 
What appears really important is not to confuse 
rationality with selfishness, since standard models 
usually promote or require selfish behavior. Still, as 
experimental economists demonstrated, selfish 
behavior is not necessarily prevalent in common 
economic decisions, somehow contradicting standard 
models. But when other actors perceive an actor’s 
selfish behavior as unfair, the latter may react, 
punishing such behavior and such costly 
consequences should drive rational behavior toward a 
non-selfish attitude. 
Behavioral finance focuses on errors of 
intuition. This means that cognitive biases are 
relevant for their intrinsic value as diagnostic 
indicators of mental mechanisms, in order to derive 
useful rules for interpreting and – eventually – 
predicting market trends.  
We argue that traditional theory is a correct but 
largely incomplete theory and behavioral finance 
represents the best attempt to complete it, by 
observing and explaining rules people follow 
unconsciously. Rationality is then a qualitative 
parameter we can use to evaluate the adequacy of an 
individual decision, not very useful, though, to 
evaluate social behavior such as those driving capital 
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market dynamics. Also, the adequacy of a decision 
largely relies upon: the number of alternatives likely 
to be generated by individuals; expectations related to 
each alternative and associated probabilities; 
subjective preferences assigned to the values of 
possible results; rules used to make decisions. 
Traditional models remain extremely robust on 
their normative power, though they usually suffer 
some kind of blindness to irrationality and actual risk 
propensity. Still, irrationality occurs and, quite often, 
not in terms of a random walk. Furthermore, most of 
the time arbitrage is not effective enough to bring 
order back. Mistakes are the essential source of 
potential value or, in other words, in the period of 
time between the emerging of a mistake in the market 
and the correction by arbitrageurs activity, value can 
be created by some investors, at least. The possibility 
for economic models to embed all discussed elements 
faces relevant obstacles on subjective behavioral 
complexity, primarily because rational behavior and 
optimizing behavior are no longer perfect conceptual 
substitutes. External constraints can limit 
optimization, but not necessarily rationality. 
In making decisions, individuals need to 
consider context variables adequately, also because 
they determine the social endorsement of a choice, 
which is more important to people than the 
evaluations carried out in terms of economic 
orthodoxy [March, 1994]. This idea would perhaps 
add a sort of collective rationality to decision making, 
since external constraints provide a strong 
contribution in terms of experience. 
Rationality should then be valued not only in 
terms of efficacy (achievement of expected results) 
but also in terms of coherency with the environment. 
Individual cognitive biases and deviations from 
rationality are not necessarily endogenous errors. In 
helping the mind to work conveniently in a complex 
environment (i.e. the capital market), rationality does 
not necessarily manage uncertainty in order to 
discover the truth, but to produce sense [Luckmann 
and Berger, 1966; Popper, 1959; Simon, 1955]. The 
more an environment is complex, the more frequent 
biases will appear, although not necessarily more 
relevant for the social system as a whole. At the same 
time, the investors’ mind dealing with market 
complexity assumes information as a guide to 
environmental coherency, which is useful in order to 
feel comfortable even in the stake of errors. 
Understanding the dynamics followed by professional 
information providers becomes crucial, as crucial is 
the possibility for such providers to give the market 
the shape they like, rather than to describe the shape 
it really has. The trading behavior of retail investors 
often demonstrates that they fail in understanding the 
true message: analysts do not always mean what they 
write in their reports [Peixinho and Taffler, 2010].2  
                                                          
2 Retail investors seem strongly mislead in their decisions 
when analyst recommendations exert positive or no 
“pressure” on these non-sophisticated clientele (i.e., “strong 
Reliance on analysts’ expertise reduces the 
perception that investors have of uncertainty [e.g., 
Jiang, Lee, and Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006]. 
Moreover, the literature gives evidence to the fact 
that analysts may play a much greater role in the bad 
news domain, since corporations’ managers tend to 
withhold bad news [e.g., Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000; 
Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 2010]. Rationales for 
trusting analyst reports are evident, since they are: 
x Mostly highly educated professionals with an 
economic, business or financial background; 
x Supposed to possess high standards in 
professional requirements as those demanded by 
the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute or 
similar organizations; 
x Bound to comply with the Code of Ethics and 
Standards of Professional Conduct, which 
implies to act with integrity, competence, 
diligence, respect, and in an ethical manner with 
the public, clients, prospective clients, etc.; but 
also to place the integrity of the investment 
profession and the interests of clients above 
their own personal interests, to promote the 
integrity of, and uphold the rules governing, 
capital markets; 
x Mostly analytical minded people with strong 
mathematical competences. 
In short, analysts forge themselves to be the 
kind of person one would trust and in doing so they 
tend to act, think and write reports in a reliable 
manner. Such habits seem to have quite an influence 
in their use of language and the way they write. 
Hardly do analysts write something they don’t think 
in a natural, straightforward and convincing way. If 
they have to, because of possible conflicts of 
interests, chances are that the way they express it, 
will contain linguistic evidence of such biases. 
Since the 1960s linguists have been encouraged 
to study the language also from the 
institutional/professional point of view, highlighting 
the way in which language is used within the context 
where the linguistic phenomenon takes place and the 
participants to the phenomenon act. The investigation 
on linguistic varieties and registers was started by 
Halliday around that period. 
Academic research on English for Specific 
Purposes (ESP) has been successfully carried out in 
Italy as well with the first publications in the 1980s. 
In addition to the traditional analysis of the morpho-
syntactic and phrasal elements, these studies 
contributed to the introduction of the concept of 
genre, including issues related to social context linked 
to textual organization [Gotti, 1991, 2003, 2005; 
Cortellazzo, 1994; Dardano, 1994; Rossini Favretti, 
1998; Cortese, 1996; Scarpa, 2001]. 
                                                                                       
buy”, “buy” or “hold”). Such recommendations are likely to 
keep stock prices artificially high and lead investors to delay 
the incorporation of going-concern uncertainties into stock 
prices. 
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The study of language seen as an exchange of 
meanings and representations in interpersonal 
contexts and as part of a communicative social 
system, started by Halliday and Moody in the 1970s, 
has been carried on by Swales and Bhatia from the 
1980s. Their research on ESP have focused on the 
particular discursive features of each genre taking 
into account the author and the social context aim, as 
well as the reasons for the lexical and grammatical 
choices. 
Sinclair’s (1991, 1996, 1998, 2004) research 
matrix on ESP is based on the assumption that 
contextual association between words can define a 
sequence of important syntagmatic relationships from 
which a varied number of abstractions can be 
inferred. The lexical elements unveiled increase the 
gap between semantics and pragmatics and have 
contributed to the study of textual cohesion and of the 
speaker’s point of view (Stubbs 2002; Tognini-
Bonelli 2001). 
This approach, together with S. Hunston and G. 
Francis’s research on model grammar (2000), 
becomes essential to investigate analyst reports 
between textual/linguistic and interpersonal contexts. 
Combining Sinclair’s theories (2004), corpus analysis 
is a useful methodology both for pragmatics and for 
discourse and ESP analysis. Pragmatics is intrinsic to 
ESP and this relationship needs to be better explained 
and theorized (Triki 2002). 
The debate on the potential conflicts of interest 
of financial analysts affiliated to investment banks is 
still lively. Former studies in literature [e.g., 
Michaely and Womack, 1999] showed the tendency 
of sell-side research analysts to issue overly 
optimistic recommendations to get business for their 
investment banks employers, favoring covered firms. 
The conflict of interest was mainly caused by 
analysts’ compensation schemes, partly based on 
their ability to attract business for their employers 
[Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter, 2008; Bradshaw, 
Richardson and Sloan, 2003; Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan, 2000; Dugar and Nathan, 1995; Lin and 
McNichols, 1998; Lin, McNichols and O’Brien, 
2003]. Of course, another important part of the 
analysts’ compensation depends on their reputation, 
often based on the accuracy and timeliness of the 
recommendations, and listed in recognized rankings 
[Hong and Kubik, 2003].  
Another possible explanation of analysts’ over-
optimism refers to the fact that they can be worried of 
jeopardizing the good relationship with the 
management of the covered firm, an important source 
of data and information for their work. Also, hyper-
optimism could be due to behavioral reasons, like the 
“selection bias”: analysts may start covering a 
company because they like it, i.e., they are overly 
optimistic on it [McNichols and O’Brien, 1997].3 
                                                          
3 Analysts’ over-optimism not only affects their 
recommendations, but also the estimates of future earnings 
[Rajan and Servaes, 1997]. 
However, more recent studies have revived the 
debate, showing that the recommendations of 
affiliated analysts are not always over-optimistic.  
The relation between optimistic reports and past 
[Clarke et al., 2006] or future [Clarke et al., 2007; 
Fleuriet and Yan, 2006; Ljungqvist, Marston, and 
Wilhelm, 2006] investment banking mandates is thus 
not clear-cut. 
Market participants devote high attention to 
analyst reports. The higher the number of analysts 
covering a company, the greater the market reaction 
in case of recommendation revision. The market 
seems to be more interested in the stocks that are 
more covered by analysts [Bradley, Bradford and 
Ritter, 2003]. For this reason, it is important to 
understand if conflicts of interest may impact on the 
investment value of analyst recommendations. While 
former evidence [Michaely and Womack, 1999] 
showed lower market returns around the 
announcement of recommendations issued by 
affiliated analysts, recent studies found that 
recommendations provided by non-independent 
analysts do not underperform those issued by 
independent analysts, raising doubts on the true 
effects of these potential conflicts of interest 
[Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter, 2008; Clarke et al., 
2006; Groysberg et al., 2005]. 
In particular, the market reaction to the 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts does 
not significantly differ from the one following reports 
issued by independent analysts, when the 
recommendation characteristics and timing are taken 
into account [Bradley et al., 2008].  
Not only the short run market reaction, but also 
the long run performance of the stocks recommended 
by affiliated or independent analysts has been 
analyzed. While former studies [Michaely and 
Womack, 1999] showed that buy recommendations 
issued by affiliated analysts underperformed those 
issued by their independent peers, recent papers do 
not support this evidence [Clarke et al., 2006; 
Groysberg et al., 2005]. 
Another stream of research investigates the 
relationship between affiliated analysts and their 
employers’ trades. For example, analyst earnings 
forecasts seem to be more accurate when the asset 
management branch of the same bank they work for 
holds more stocks of the company they cover [Irvine, 
Simko, and Nathan, 2004]. Also, analysts’ 
recommendations tend to be more optimistic if the 
stock of the covered company is held by mutual funds 
affiliated to the same bank [Mola and Guidolin, 
2009]. Furthermore, merger and acquisition bank 
advisors buy (sell) the acquirers that their affiliated 
analysts upgrade (downgrade) [Haushalter and 
Lowry, 2009]. A very recent and interesting paper 
[Jordan, Liu and Wu, 2011] studies how institutional 
investors deal with recommendations issued by their 
affiliated analysts, showing that sell-side research is 
indeed used by their employers. This evidence is 
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important in at least two respects: it shows that 
institutional investors believe that sell-side research is 
valuable, and it suggests that potential conflicts of 
interest may be not so important, given the fact that 
the investment banks themselves follow their 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations.  
 
2.  Data and Linguistic analysis 
 
2.1  Data Analysis 
 
To carry out the present study, we analyze reports 
issued by Goldman Sachs Research in the period 
November 2009 – November 2011. In particular, we 
consider two types of reports: S&P 500 Beige Books, 
and US Weekly Kick starts. 
S&P 500 Beige Books contain a backward view 
of every past three months, and they are inspired by 
FED Beige Books but, unlike them, which rely on a 
variety of sources, Goldman’s version emphasizes a 
series of statements made by senior executives during 
earnings conference calls on market relevant issues, 
concerning corporations listed in the S&P 500.  
US Weekly Kick starts are much shorter and 
synthetic reports, issued each Friday and they aim at 
providing tips for the following trading week.  
The choice of these two types of reports was 
mainly driven by: 
x Wide range of information provided and 
documents’ availability, which also affect the 
length of the time series; 
x Content and style homogeneity; 
x Focus on S&P 500; 
x Methodology based on classes of corporations 
and fundamentals; 
x Possibility to catch directions in market cycles 
in both types of reports working with different 
keywords and Type Token Ratios (henceforth 
TTR) (Tokens are the words in a text considered 
once. Types refer to the total number of words, 
repeated as many times as they appear. The ratio 
between types and tokens (TTR) may widely 
vary also in accordance with the length of the 
text under observation. Such type/token 
relationship is informative, and gives a measure 
of the textual lexical density and variety.). 
 
2.1.1  Beige Books 
 
Having a coverage range of few months, Beige Book 
(henceforth BB) reports allow having a wider view 
than the one offered by Weekly Kick Starts 
(henceforth KS), particularly on the S&P 500 
dynamics. 
By jointly considering the two types of reports, 
it is possible to observe that the longer and less 
frequent reports assess the direction toward which the 
market tends to move, evidencing rationales 
underlining such trends at corporate and 
class/industry level. The more frequent ones tend to 
confirm directions, basing judgments and valuations 
on fundamentals’ performances emerging in the US 
financial market, highlighting emerging issues week 
by week. 
 
Table 1. BB statistics 
 
Text file BB Overall 
File size 1,237,469 
Tokens (running words) in text 207,073 
Tokens used for word list 200,589 
Types (distinct words) 7,075 
Type/Token Ratio (TTR) 3.53 
Standardized TTR 40.16 
Standardized TTR std.dev. 59.45 
Standardized TTR basis 1 
 
Table 1 gives us an idea of the BB subcorpus 
quantitative features. The BB subcorpus is made up 
of about 207,000 running words (the total number of 
words), of which about 7,000 are distinct words (i.e. 
as if considered only once). The ratio between these 
numbers, the TTR, tells us how dense and variable 
the language used in these documents is. The 
standardized TTR, calculated every 1,000 words, is 
definitely high. The language is therefore rich of 
expressions mainly identifying market trends, 
informative and evaluative expressions and, less 
frequently, predictive ones.  
The documents are on average 50 pages long 
and contain a number of running words comprised 
between 19,600 and 30,600. Tables included in the 
reports help make the data easily identifiable and 
readable.  
The objective of these documents is overtly 
stated in the section Key Takeaways from S&P500, in 
a comparison with The Summary of Commentary on 
Economic Conditions (known as the Federal Reserve 
BB, p.3 of each document):  
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The Summary of Commentary on Economic 
Conditions, commonly known as the Beige Book, is 
published by the Federal Reserve eight times per 
year. In it, the 12 regional Reserve branches offer 
anecdotal evidence on the current economic 
environment in their respective regions based on 
interviews with key business contacts, economists, 
market experts, and other sources. In our quarterly 
Beige Book publication, we review the earnings 
transcripts of companies in the S&P 500 to monitor 
the anecdotal evidence of pricing, volume, costs and 
thematic trends. This quarter’s report contains 
excerpts from 32 companies that account for 14% of 
total S&P 500 revenues and comprise 20% of the 
S&P 500 equity capitalization. All management 
comments on the following pages were taken 
verbatim from the company transcripts as recorded by 
Call Street and accessed via FactSet. All company 
data is as of February 3, 2010. This quarter, we 
highlight (…) 
These few lines unveil the documents’ 
frequency of issue, which is quarterly, their purpose 
to screen subjective data of fundamental and thematic 
trends. The number of companies and the percentage 
they represent in terms of revenue in the market and 
of equity capitalization is disclosed. 
The source is better specified with reference to 
management comments and to the recording and 
transcription technologies, as well as to the issue date. 
Then, the list of the main themes (4-6 on average) 
follows to suggest the main content. Afterwards, they 
are developed one by one. A table on the companies 
mentioned in the report is placed right after the table 
of contents, previous to the key takeaways, 
highlighting their relevance. 
 Once the themes are introduced, they are 
further developed reporting the companies’ 
management points of view. Then, Consumer 
Discretionary are observed, with the use of + and/or – 
symbols, which straightforwardly give an idea of the 
sector positive and negative trends, in terms of 
revenues, demand, risks, economic recovery, 
international growth, commodity inflation and capex. 
Consumer Staples follow with a more relevant 
presence of Business outlook. Energy, Financials, 
Health Care, Industrials, Information Technology, 
Materials, Telecom Services and Utilities are the 
other sectors taken into considerations. Disclosures 
close the reports.  
Unlike the KKs, as further highlighted below, 
the BBs are mainly informative, reporting facts, and 
evaluative on the part of the management. Predictive 
sections are less frequent suggesting a lower 
involvement by the analyst.  
 
2.1.2  Kick start 
 
Table 2. KK statistics 
 
Text file KS Overall 
File size 604,366 
Tokens (running words) in text 98,944 
Tokens used for word list 87,319 
Types (distinct words) 4,708 
Type/Token Ratio (TTR) 5.39 
Standardised TTR 35.57 
Standardised TTR std.dev. 61.85 
Standardised TTR basis 1 
 
Table 2 underlines the KS subcorpus 
quantitative features. The KS subcorpus is made up 
of about 98,944 running words, a lower number than 
the BB subcorpus, even if the amount of shorter 
documents is higher. Distinctive words are 87,319 
with a standardized TTR slightly higher than that of 
BB, meaning a more dense and varied language. The 
language is rich of expressions identifying market 
trends, informative, evaluative and predictive stances.  
Their textual organization is characterized by an 
average length of 20 pages, including a 1/2-page full-
text section (a total of 99,000 words) and numerous 
graphs and tables. A first observation has highlighted 
the textual structure and the lexical variety and 
density of the reports, characterized by the expression 
Kick Start and their objective to be a starting point for 
the following days.  
Therefore, the main functions exploited by the 
documents are informative, evaluative and predictive: 
“Your five-minute guide to the US equity market: 
performance, earnings, valuation, & more” (Kick 
Start November 16, 2009). 
They are released on Friday and provide 
background knowledge on the previous week, assess 
the events and forecast future measures and actions. 
The linguistic strategies associated with this textual 
genre are geared towards reporting facts and 
assessing them, predicting future actions in a way that 
seeks to make the data and measures easier to 
understand for the ordinary readership.  
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Textual and non-textual features, which enhance 
the communicative function of the text, are clear, 
intelligible and unambiguous, taking into account the 
different target readers. However, when tables and 
charts are poorly commented, the ordinary reader 
may find difficulties in understanding the data and, 
therefore, the message conveyed.  
The identification of the most recurring lexical 
items used by analysts to communicate with expert 
and non-expert readers is critical as they contribute to 
build a relationship based on trust, loyalty, prudence, 
care, adequacy and confidentiality. 
Investment analyses and recommendations must 
rely upon sound, fair and accurate elements. While 
writing their reports, analysts must follow a code of 
ethics and professional conduct standards, aiming at 
improving their relationship with market participants 
and, in particular, investors. 
The first page information highlights the 
coherence vis-à-vis the evaluation and advice 
provided, as well as possible conflicts of interest. 
Most documents consist of the report tout court in the 
first one or two pages, followed by revision, 
valuation, performance assessment, 
recommendations, forecasts and strategies in the form 
of charts and graphs, let alone the analyst certification 
and some legal disclosures. As these documents are 
mainly presented in the form of tables, they leave the 
ordinary reader with the task to decode the data given 
according to her personal, and possibly professional, 
competence and skills. 
 
2.2  Linguistic Analysis 
 
2.2.1  Modals 
 
Following Donohue [2006], the credibility of 
narrative forecasts depends on the choice of linguistic 
conventions that characterize a specific genre. 
A typical linguistic feature of these reports is the 
use of a wide range of modal verbs. They are even 
considered as hedging devices, i.e. they better 
exemplify the analyst’s degree of certainty in 
forecasting future events, and, therefore, enhance her 
credibility. 
In analyzing the use of modality, both in BBs 
and in KSs will is the most frequent one, followed by 
can (BBs) and may (KSs). The use of will gives 
evidence of certainty in the author/management point 
of view. Will, as well as may and can, is an epistemic 
modal, i.e. it expresses the degree of commitment by 
the speaker to what she states, involving her belief, 
knowledge, etc., with reference to the claim [Palmer, 
1986, Facchinetti, 1992]. This means that in KSs 
analysts express confidence in what they are 
communicating towards future outlooks. Instead, in 
BBs, the frequent use of will denotes management’s 
documented attitude to overconfidence [Shefrin, 
2006]. May normally shows greater formality and 
lower probability which supports KS analysts 
approach to the way they want to convey their 
opinions and recommendations, keeping a certain 
distance from them, and being cautious. As a matter 
of fact, in BBs, which report the management’s point 
of view, can is more frequent, as analysts are even 
less involved in the information provided. Should, the 
third most frequent modal in both subcorpora, is 
normally used to give advice, denoting a higher 
involvement of analysts’ reputation, and is higher in 
KSs as they are more predictive and evaluative than 
BBs. Should implies some ambiguity, uncertainty and 
personal judgment and may sound as a suggestion of 
how to behave in certain circumstances. Shall, which 
is very common in legal documents, as it represents 
an order, a direction, is absent from all documents, 
supporting the idea of giving general opinions. We do 
not even find it in the legal disclosures present in the 
last part of the documents. 
Considering the overall frequency of all modals 
present in the documents, we can observe that the 
same patterns are employed and the first seven 
modals are exactly identical and in the same order in 
both BBs and KSs. The only exception is represented 
by may and can which are inverted, due to a higher 
degree of overconfidence of managers compared to 
analysts. However, the opinion expressed seems to be 
shared by analysts in both BBs and KSs. 
Not only verbs, but also adjectives (e.g., 
probable, possible), adverbs (e.g., probably, 
certainly), nouns (e.g., thought, recommendation), 
and lexical verbs (e.g., advise, recommend, believe) 
concur to build modality, which is semantically 
identified. It gives us an idea of what is possible, 
necessary, probable, etc. The whole sentence is to be 
considered to reach the whole and real meaning 
expressed by the analyst. 
 
2.2.2  The Text Protagonists 
 
The reports we have investigated are economic-
financial analyses, written basically by the same team 
of analysts working for Goldman Sachs, and 
addressing investors and market experts. KSs 
protagonists are analysts and clients. In the General 
Disclosures section this is clearly stated “This 
research is for our clients only”. BBs also involve 
analysts and clients, and, in particular, the covered 
companies.  
In KSs, the analyst’s point of view is 
predominantly underlined by the use of the pronoun 
we: e.g., “We highlight”, “We continue to believe”, 
“we advise clients”, “we are more cautious”, etc. The 
purpose to help their clients understand their message 
is also evident. As a matter of fact, we find sections 
giving a definition of certain expressions: “There are 
‘known knowns’. These are things we know that we 
know.” (February 5, 2012 KS). In the disclosures, a 
definition of what is intended for Buy, Neutral, Sell, 
Return Potential and other expressions is given (e.g. 
February 12, 2010 KS). Other sections are headlined 
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“Conversations we are having with clients (…)”, 
often in the form of Questions and Answers to make 
the addressee feel taken care of. In February 19, 2010 
KS, we even find “Conversations we are having with 
clients: our questions and their answers”, as to give 
authority to the client’s opinion.  
In BBs, the predominant opinion is that of 
management and analysts report their point of view: 
e.g., “Management teams highlighted”, “Many 
globally-exposed firms commented”, “Many 
companies noted”, etc. Management teams, 
managements, managers, companies, US firms and 
customers are thoroughly mentioned with reference to 
their views and behaviors.  
In investigating the occurrence of pronouns, we 
observe a prevalence of the pronoun we in both KSs 
and BBs. This means a high involvement by the 
author in the discourse. However, while in BBs we 
refers to the management’s point of view, in KSs it 
refers to the analyst’s perception. Moreover, it 
represents the analyst team opinion, which is shared 
among the team, keeping in mind that the same 
analysts write both types of documents. We also 
reduces the distance between the writer and the 
reader, giving strength to what is uttered.  
An element which is completely different in 
BBs and KSs is the use of the pronoun I, that we 
typically find repeated in the first type of reports, 
while the number of occurrences in the second one is 
definitely limited. This can be explained by the 
different participants in these documents: as BBs 
report the management’s opinion, the pattern “I 
think” is very frequent, also suggesting personal 
opinion and management’s attitude in highlighting 
their frontline role.  
The high frequency of you in BB is an element 
of the colloquialism characterizing conference calls 
frequently reported in the documents, also assessing 
the kind of personal relationship between analysts 
and managers of the corporations listed in the 
S&P500. This leads directly to the issue of the effort 
analysts put in cultivating personal relationships with 
the managers of the corporations they cover and the 
conflicts of interest that may arise, as 
abovementioned. You builds a dialogue between the 
writer/speaker and the reader, asking the reader 
respond, to carry out a certain action. This seems to 
underline a sort of double dialogue: one between the 
manager and the analyst and one between the analyst 
and the reader. However, the analyst role does not 
entail filtering the manager’s opinion apart from her 
choice of the extracts to include in the report. 
Of course, on the one hand, the manager has 
chosen to communicate certain information, and, on 
the other, the analyst further selects and chooses 
among that information. Therefore, analysts are able 
to emphasize or smooth the strength of the 
information conveyed.  
The use of the possessive adjective your, 
instead, seems to be analysts’ peculiarity, showing 
their tendency to reduce their responsibility towards 
how information is conveyed to generate market 
expectations. The pronoun they, which is frequent in 
BBs, is normally employed by analysts to report both 
investors’ and managers’ behavior, keeping a certain 
distance from them.  
A both quantitative and qualitative comparison 
of the two subcorpora (KSs and BBs) highlights an 
evident diversity in the language variety. As 
abovementioned, while the number of tokens of KSs, 
which include a higher number of documents, is 
98,944, the number of tokens in BBs is 207,073. The 
TTR shows a greater language variance in KKs than 
in BBs. This means that BBs are longer documents 
devoting more importance to words and descriptions 
while KKs rely more upon graphs and tables, in 
general on intertextuality (Bhatia 2004). Therefore, 
while KSs seem less loaded and therefore easily 
readable, BBs are longer and appear more complex to 
decode. However, the use of tables and graphs 
accompanied by short texts, characterized by 
language variety, leaves the reader with the 
responsibility to build her own judgment. This is also 
supported by the qualitative analysis which identifies 
the textual informative, evaluative and predictive 
functions present in KSs while BBs are mainly 
informative and rarely evaluative and predictive on 
the part of the analysts. Of course, in the 
managements’ words we find predictions and 
evaluations. This difference originates from the fact 
that BBs refer to the previous three months while KSs 
refer to a much shorter time span, with a perspective 
on the following week.  
The different language variety is also due to the 
effort put by analysts in addressing the market with 
their view of the future. This results in a higher 
reputational risk taken by analysts. 
Table 3 shows the frequency of expressions 
underlining analysts and managers personal 
involvement in the message. While in KSs it is the 
analyst point of view that emerges, in BBs these 
items are normally employed by managers. 
Data show that analysts cautiously use words 
belonging to the semantic field of forecasts denoting 
their tendency to convey the message through indirect 
linguistic strategies aiming at reducing their 
reputational risk. They avoid taking precise positions 
on future predictions unless strictly necessary. At the 
same time, in BBs these expressions are typical of 
managers in the extracts reported. The lower use by 
analysts is evidence of their choice to mitigate 
managers’ overconfidence. For example, think is four 
times more frequent in BBs than in KSs and feel and 
guess are present in BBs but not in KSs. Another 
instance is that of point, which tries to catch the 
reader’s attention on specific issues. Instead, items 
such as recommend, forecast and view are definitely 
higher in KSs, underlining these documents’ purpose 
to convey analysts’ predictions. 
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Table 3. Personal involvement statistics 
 
Expressions KS % BB % 
anticipate* 21 0,0212% 120 0,0580% 
believ* 74 0,0748% 228 0,1101% 
expect* 416 0,4204% 773 0,3733% 
favor* 17 0,0172% 62 0,0299% 
feel* 0 0,0000% 111 0,0536% 
forecast* 531 0,5367% 111 0,0536% 
guess*   0,0000% 20 0,0097% 
highlight* 39 0,0394% 47 0,0227% 
outlook* 112 0,1132% 418 0,2019% 
overlook* 2 0,0020% 2 0,0010% 
point* 64 0,0647% 338 0,1632% 
recommend* 320 0,3234% 2 0,0010% 
suggest* 24 0,0243% 23 0,0111% 
think* 4 0,0040% 832 0,4018% 
view* 242 0,2446% 99 0,0478% 
Total 1866 1,8859% 3186 1,5386% 
 
2.2.3 The credibility issue 
 
The relationship between the way messages are 
conveyed and the data offered to support them is 
crucial in terms of the credibility built, especially 
when forecasts are involved [Hursti, 2011]. An 
element to consider is the market reaction both in the 
short and in the long term, as sometimes corrections 
intervene. A greater number of expressions 
identifying future events and the preciseness of the 
forecast normally result in a greater response by the 
market [Miller 2009]. The linguistic strategies 
employed influence investors’ decisions as they 
complement those tables that could otherwise be 
difficult to quantify. Clusters of negative words could 
be positively associated with low future earnings and 
companies’ share price losses.  
As above mentioned, credibility is enhanced by 
the use of modal verbs and of modal qualifiers such 
as “presumably” “likely”, “modestly”. The presence 
of modals showing uncertainty (may, could, should), 
especially if accompanied by adverbs, should 
function as a red flag to a rational and sensible 
investor. 
Disclosures also play an important role in 
building credibility. 
Forecast credibility also depends on analysts’ 
own features, on the one hand, and on clients’ 
expertise and mood on the other.  
 
3. Behavioral Insights 
 
Theories on behavioral finance were originally 
proposed to explain how financial markets work and 
individual investors behave more realistically than 
classical ones. Prices are originated by very complex 
dynamics and by “anomalies” which can be explained 
only by understanding bounded rationality 
mechanisms and cognitive biases, both at individual 
and groups’ level. While trying to understand such 
elements, the way information is produced and 
conveyed to the market deserves particular attention. 
Individual investors need a minimum set of skills and 
expertise. We often refer to these abilities as talent or 
intuition, i.e., the capacity to catch foggy signals and 
connect them to subjective expectations, but also to 
understand other investors’ sentiment. 
The information available in the market, 
although not complete, tends to be homogeneous and 
considered widely reliable by investors. Therefore, 
analysts have a strategic role in constructing a frame, 
which is supposed to represent reality. As a matter of 
fact, investors, in a sort of agency relationship with 
analysts, very rarely carry out fundamental analyses 
on their own. 
Thus, in a weak form of market efficiency, 
prices are mostly influenced by the information 
published. At the same time, the latter is influenced 
by recent past market trends, activating a loop 
reaction, which excludes long run predictions and 
fundamental analyses. 
This denotes a rather active role played by 
analysts in the market. Not only do they convey 
information to the market, but they also produce it 
and select it, being very much aware of their function, 
power and responsibility.  
It is, therefore, evident that they will try to 
maximize their utility, just as any other market actor 
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will do. That is to say that they will tend to maximize 
their reputation as main source of value and minimize 
the risks deriving from their work. Reputation 
depends largely on how successful they are in 
interpreting market dynamics, since the value of the 
information conveyed depends on how successful 
their clients will be when investing as suggested. As a 
consequence, they try to maximize forecast accuracy 
or, in other words, to minimize the forecast errors. 
Risk is represented by the probability of errors. 
However, another source of risk is given by the single 
analyst decision on if and to what extent to deviate 
from other analysts’ forecasts, or from the so-called 
“consensus”, typically the mean or median forecast. 
Deviating from consensus is risky for an analyst since 
in case her forecast is less accurate than it, she would 
experience a reputational loss. Instead, if she aligns 
with consensus, and this proves not to be accurate, 
she can always share the blame with other analysts, 
and thus not be penalized in terms of reputation. 
Analysts’ value function represents the basic 
motivational mechanism driving their decision-
making and behavior. We use the term “value” 
instead of “utility” function to underline that we 
believe that analysts follow the prospect theory 
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], as proposed in the 
behavioral finance literature, instead of the traditional 
utility function [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947]. Since the latter is based on a measure of total 
wealth, we believe that this gives a far too vague idea 
of the term utility that is not necessarily coherent with 
the dynamics involved in financial markets.  
Analysts, although strongly shaped by their 
education, career, professional standards and 
mentality, are exposed to cognitive biases just like 
any other market actor. Therefore, they display the 
same type of risk propensity described in prospect 
theory: risk averse in the domain of gains and risk 
takers in the domain of losses. We claim that analysts 
value potential gains and losses with respect to a 
reference point represented by their individual 
reputation when issuing the report, i.e., their status 
quo. 
To understand why this occurs, we have to 
evaluate the above-mentioned sources of risk, and 
link them to market movements: the risk associated 
with a reputational loss in case of forecast inaccuracy.  
Behavioral finance states that individual 
reactions to bad news are usually higher than the one 
following good news. In this respect, it seems that 
inaccuracy could be perceived more when markets go 
down. In other words, it would be better for investors 
to anticipate future crisis, instead of future booms. 
The risk associated with inaccuracy in case of 
downturns thus seems larger compared to the lack of 
accuracy in bull markets. 
While analysts’ utility functions have been 
proposed in previous studies [Lim, 2001], as far as 
we know, there is no theoretical model of analysts’ 
value function, based on prospect theory, available 
yet. 
In settling on the measure of subjectively 
perceived risks by analysts, which has to be based on 
their use of language, we also need to determine a 
reference point, which in our view can be represented 
by the average of differences between positive and 
negative keywords (see Table 6 below). Such figures 
signal and orientate, consciously or not, the overall 
mood in the market. Therefore, the more analysts 
force their language to diverge from the reference 
point, the more they will feel exposed to reputational 
risk. Although we do not have the complete empirical 
evidence yet, since the present research should be 
considered as a work in progress, our preliminary 
results suggest that when the value of the index rises, 
analysts tend to reduce the use of positive keywords, 
since they feel that the market itself pushes investors’ 
activity and they do not need to take any particular 
risk in suggesting a stronger involvement. When the 
index tend to decrease, analysts start to increase the 
use of keywords, gradually deviating from the 
reference point in order to mitigate the negative effect 
of market dynamics in investors’ sentiment, but in 
doing so, they take an increasing risk share of 
misleading investors decisions and drawing 
unrealistic pictures of market prospects, accepting a 
significant reputational risk. 
The shape of analysts’ value function is then 
impressively similar to the one of the generic value 
function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
We display a possible analysts’ value function in 
figure 1. 
In settling on the measure of subjective risk, we 
state that they use the language as a tool which allows 
them to balance two opposite needs: they have to 
truthfully issue their best forecasts, on the one hand, 
and they may be willing to influence market 
dynamics, on the other hand, as a consequence of 
possible conflict of interest and/or other biases 
originated by their affiliation. In this sense, the 
measure of the risk analysts perceive can be 
calculated using linguistic parameters extracted from 
their reports. From a behavioral point of view, the 
texts examined show at first sight several biases, 
among which analysts’ overconfidence about their 
ability to interpret fundamentals figures and to assess 
their credibility. In doing so, they rely on a wide 
range of data, on numerical analyses and on sources 
carefully conveyed through sound linguistic 
strategies. They use a great variety of terms, in order 
to increase the number of issues covered in their 
reports, paying a great deal of attention in avoiding to 
take a clear personal position, unless strictly 
necessary. In other words, whenever possible, 
analysts present market facts in order to give their 
clients an information frame within which they can 
draw their own opinion and make decisions. 
In order to understand how financial phenomena 
reflect in or are deviated by language and whether 
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financial and linguistic trends follow the same 
patterns or not, we studied the index performance in 
the analyzed period. We picked the value of S&P 500 
as the closing price on the first trading day following 
the issuance of the report. 
 
Figure 1. Analysts’ Value Function 
Value
Reputational
Gains
Reputational
Losses
RISK-AVERSE 
BEHAVIOR
RISK-TAKING
BEHAVIOR
REFERENCE POINT: 
Status Quo, i.e., 
Current Reputation
 
 
Since KKs are issued on Friday, apart from 
some postponed ones due to festivities, we took the 
closing price of the S&P 500 on the Monday 
following the report issuance (Whenever Monday 
happened to be a non working day, we would pick the 
first following working day). With regard to the 
index’s performance, we isolated different time spans 
in which the market followed a defined trend. We 
consider a trend to be positive when the index return 
performs higher than 4% for a continuous and stable 
time span, and negative when the performance is 
below - 4%. The choice of 4% corresponds to a value 
the trader starts to consider interesting as emerged 
from our analysis.  
We call “lateral” the market in which no clear 
trend can be observed. Following this methodology, 
we identified four positive and four negative periods, 
as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Market cycles’ returns, directions and lengths in weeks 
 
S&P500 Length in weeks Returns Direction 
- 6,88 % Down 4 
14,17 % Up 11 
- 12,52 % Down 6 
15,15 % Up 11 
8, 73 % Up 7 
- 6,79 % Down 6 
- 16,39 % Down 6 
13,58 % Up 4 
 
It is now possible to jointly study the use of 
language and the index performance aiming to find 
whether and, eventually, to what extent, language 
may conceal financial events, mitigating analysts’ 
feelings and misleading investors. 
Following the linguistic analysis we selected in 
the reports a number of keywords, namely four in 
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Kick Starts, and four in Beige Books. Using 
Wordsmith Tools 5.0, we isolated words’ clusters in 
order to examine the linguistic context in which 
analysts use keywords. In this way, we have the 
possibility to discern if the selected keywords are 
used in a positive or negative sense. We then 
calculated the difference between the number of 
keywords used with a positive meaning and the 
amount of keywords used in a negative sense, in 
order to have a perception of the prevalence of 
positive over negative usage of the keywords. 
In what follows, we present the preliminary 
results we came across analyzing Kick Starts reports 
(Since the results for the Beiges Books reports are 
similar, we do not report them here to save space). 
The keywords selected in KSs reports are: Grow* 
[the asterisk signify that we considered every word 
including the root “grow”]; Earn – EPS; Profit; 
Perform.  
These keywords have been chosen for being 
representative of analysts’ mood, among the most 
frequent in reports. In Table 5, we present the number 
of keywords included in two KK reports as an 
example, as well as the value of the index’s return in 
the first day following the report issuing day. 
 
Table 5. S&P 500 returns and number of keywords in reports 
 
Date S&P500 return Grow* (pos) Grow* (neg) Diff. pos-neg 
May 3, 2010 - 6,39% 11 3 8 
Nov 1, 2010 +3,60% 6 3 3 
 
In each period, we determined the difference 
between positive and negative use of keywords in all 
the reports, and calculated the average for the period. 
Table 6 shows the average of differences between 
positive and negative keywords use in the 90 Kick 
Starts reports. 
 
Table 4. Average of differences between positive and negative keywords use over 90 Kick Starts reports 
 
Grow* Earn – EPS Profit Performance 
2,87 4,90 1,04 1,76 
 
On average, among the 90 KSs reports 
considered, we find that the positive use of keywords 
prevails. This very simple evidence confirms the idea 
that analysts tend to be quite optimistic. As a matter 
of fact, the negative use of keywords prevails on the 
positive one only in few cases, mainly during those 
periods in which we do not find a clear trend in the 
market (lateral), which we did not find relevant 
within the analysis. 
Using the frame of prospect theory, the data in 
Table 6 represent analysts’ reference point in their 
value function. In other and more simple words, we 
claim that analysts, consciously or not, increase or 
decrease the use of keywords in the desired direction, 
with reference to the average use of them, in order to 
boost or mitigate market reactions. 
To test this hypothesis, we link the results in 
Table 6 to the study of keywords for each period. We 
are interested in seeing when the average of each 
period is higher or lower than the overall average (the 
reference point), but we also want to see if values are 
under/above average during positive/negative market 
trends.  
In table 7, we show the use of keywords within 
the different time spans. Darkened cells are the ones 
in which the values are above average, while clear 
cells are the ones whose values are below average. 
 
 
Table 5. Keywords use and market trends 
 
Period S&P500 Grow* Earn/EPS  Profit Perform 
Overall Reference point 2,87 4,90 1,04 1,76 
1 -6,88% Down 4,7 11,0 0,0 -0,3 
2 14,17% Up 1,9 7,1 1,4 4,0 
3 -12,52% Down 3,7 8,7 1,5 0,0 
4 15,15% Up 2,4 3,2 3,3 2,1 
5 8,73% Up 6,5 5,5 3,0 4,0 
6 -6,79% Down 3,5 8,2 1,3 2,7 
7 -16,39% Down 3,0 4,5 2,4 0,7 
8 13,58% Up 0,5 2,5 4,0 1,3 
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For example, during the negative market period 
in which the index performed – 6.88%, the overall 
average use of keyword “Grow” was 2.87 and the 
period average use 4.7. In such a case, we claim that 
this evidence denotes analysts’ reluctance in 
conveying bad news to the market, as the average 
number of the keyword is higher than the reference 
point. 
Reading table 7 vertically, by columns, we 
notice that the keyword “Perform” is the most 
coherent with the index trend: in five out of eight 
periods, the values vary in the same direction of S&P 
500. On the other hand, “Grow” diverges in six out of 
eight cases. “Earn/EPS” and “Profit” seem to 
behave rather independently. By reading the table 
horizontally, by rows, we have a further appraisal. In 
the first period, the index performs -6.88%, while 
keywords are mostly used with a positive meaning 
and two of them have a higher value than average. 
Period 3 is negative marketwise, and again positive 
keywords are used more than negative ones; three out 
of four of them being above average. In period 6, the 
mentioned tendency is even clearer, since all 
keywords are used in a positive sense above the time 
series average, enforcing the perception of analysts’ 
optimism in spite of market performance. In period 7, 
instead, the tendency is not as clear, but still present. 
During positive market trend periods, although 
positive use of keywords still prevails, we see a 
different behavior: in period 2 three out of four 
keywords are used with an above-average frequency, 
in period 4 above and below averages are equal, in 
period 8 below average use is clear, and finally, in 
period 5 the opposite is true. 
Similar findings can be referred to beige books 
reports, though keywords were different due to 
different relevance in the documents. 
Summing up, though we fell we still do not have 
a definitive evidence that analyst’s behavior clearly 
follows the prospect theory value function, we 
consider the main intuition quite sustainable. Thus, 
the basic idea that financial analysts behave as posed 
by Kahneman and Tversky holds.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Multidisciplinary study of financial analysts reports 
appear to be the frontline of a new research approach 
to market actors’ behavior. Linguistic analysis helps 
interpreting cognitive biases in conveying 
information to the market by professional analysts 
and, possibly, managers. We find that analysts tend to 
minimize the risk of jeopardizing their reputation 
using sound linguistic strategies, avoiding, when 
possible, to assess clear and univocal claims, 
referring to numerical supports and insiders’ 
statements to enforce their conclusions. 
Clearly they tend to avoid personal opinions, 
always leaving room for justifying possible errors. 
They seem to follow a value function that still has to 
be derived and tested empirically, which, however, 
seems to be quite similar to the one proposed in 
prospect theory. That is to say that professional 
analysts avoid reputational risk in the positive 
domain, while seem more risk takers in the negative 
one, with respect to a reference point represented by 
their status quo, i.e., their reputation when they issue 
the report. 
More research work is needed to derive and 
empirically test such value function. We are carrying 
out this work using databases from some of world’s 
most important investment banks, such us Goldman 
Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, UBS, Barclays and others. 
The aim is to define the value function, to find 
and classify cognitive biases specific for financial 
analysts and, possibly, define a numerical parameter 
that allows to weight the actual credibility of financial 
public information. 
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